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normative and positive economics 
the politicians compete are votes. Thus it is 
crucial for their success that they design the 
content of party programs and election plat-
forms as closely as possible to their voters' 
preferences, and, simultaneously, as far away as 
possible from competing parties. The observed 
tendency toward "median voter" programs and 
increasing political competition can be ana-
lyzed and explained by the niche approach. 
Niches can be formed and created, especially 
through advertising. Consumers and voters can 
react and change their preferences, and a 
formerly well-adjusted fIrm will exit because 
of a vanishing niche. The exact identifIcation of 
the boundaries of the niche is one of the major 
problems, both in theory and reality. The niche 
is not a crisp set, but rather a fuzzy set. 
Conclusion 
Comprehensive theoretical models of niches 
are not yet well developed in economics. The 
existing approaches are often too close to 
biological terms and they lack distinct eco-
nomic content. They offer, however, a better 
instrument for explaining competitive behavior 
in segmented markets than do "orthodox" 
economics. Market segmentation was formerly 
descriptive, and the concept of niches allows 
the identifIcation of strategies and the predic-
tion of future developments. Niche theory is a 
rather universal concept applying to marketing, 
product placement, spatial placement and even 
ideological platforms of politics. It is a strong 
analytical tool for all situations where we have 
to explain competition, why it takes place or 
not, and how one can evade it. 
See also: 
evolutionary economics: major contemporary 
themes; producer and consumer sovereignty 
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normative and positive 
economics 
Virtually every mainstream textbook in eco-
nomics begins with a brief discussion of the 
difference between positive and normative 
economics, made a dogma by those who 
slavishly followed Lionel Robbins in his Essay 
on the Nature and Significance of Economic 
Science (1932). For example, Schotter's Micro-
economics states that: 
Normative or welfare economics deals with 
what ought to be rather than what is and 
involves prescriptive statements that may be 
based on value judgments. Positive econom-
ics deals with what is rather than what ought 
to be and involves descriptive statements 
that are objective and verifiable. 
(Schotter 1994: 4) 
Schotter's emphasis is not unusual. Since 
positive economics is thought to be objective 
and verifiable, normative economics by impli-
cation is subjective and not subject to rigorous 
validation. This view is inherited from David 
Hume, who argued that a gulf exists between 
"is" and "ought"; and, more recently, from the 
1930s logical positivists, who claimed both that 
scientific statements alone are rational and that 
scientific statements are those that are empiri-
cally verifiable. Mainstream economists, ac-
cordingly, claim that their work is scientific on 
account of its being value-neutral. 
Facts are theory-laden 
Economic methodologists, however, deny that 
empirical evidence confirms a theory as scien-
tific, because disconfirming evidence may al-
ways turn up in the future, and because any 
given set of facts may give support to conflict-
ing theories. They also deny that theories that 
stand up to empirical tests designed to falsify 
theories must be scientific, because theorists 
can always add immunizing, auxiliary assump-
tions to protect core principles. Accordingly, it 
has not been shown that theories are scientific 
in virtue of their relation to facts and evidence. 
Indeed, philosophers of science since Norwood 
Russell Hanson (and later Thomas Kuhn) have 
argued that subjective factors are inevitably 
involved in the development of scientific ideas, 
and that facts are theory-laden because they 
are identified from the perspective of PARA-
DIGMS. At the same time, many philosophers 
reject the notion that value judgments are 
inevitably subjective, and, indeed, often argue 
that widely accepted value judgments may 
possess as much or more "objectivity" as many 
scientific propositions. 
normative and positive"economics 
Values permeate economics 
The mainstream view, then, that there exists a 
clear dividing line between positive and nor-
mative economics, is mistaken. Some tradi-
tional economists admit this when they allow 
that an individual's value judgments influence 
the views they develop. But this view is not 
widely supported in the mainstream of eco-
nomics. Even when it is, value judgments are 
often understood as "individual motivation 
may shape theory," rather than as "the world 
views of economists in general influence the 
very questions they ask, the significance they 
attribute to some issues rather than others, and 
the concepts they select." For example, neo-
classical economics focuses only upon instru-
mental rationality, and then characterizes 
decision making as rational when it is atomistic 
and self-interested. But this selective character-
ization of behavior has never been given any 
real scientific defense and, rather, represents a 
theoretical commitment one must have to be 
admitted to the ranks of neoclassical econo-
mists. 
Thus, while it cannot be said that a clear 
dividing line exists between positive and nor-
mative economics, it is still unlikely that anyone 
would deny that there is a difference between 
positive and normative statements. This sug-
gests that the important issue for heterodox 
economists is to understand how positive and 
normative economics are related and influence 
one another. Wilber (1996) puts this especially 
well by rejecting the notion that value neutrality 
makes sense, and by asking how our values 
come to permeate economic reasoning (see 
VALUE JUDGMENTS AND WORLD VIEWS) . 
Characterizing and appraising value 
judgments 
One proposal for how to do this, deriving from 
a reconsideration of the nature of values, is 
discussed by Blaug (1992). He draws attention 
to Nagel's (1961) distinction between two types 
of value judgments: characterizing value judg-
ments and appraising value judgments. Char-
acterizing value judgments concern the choice 
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of subject matter, the mode of investigation to 
be followed and the criteria for judging results. 
Characterizing value judgments involve the 
sort of methodological judgments that are 
indispensable to any science. Appraising value 
judgments concern evaluative statements about 
the world, and are the basis for our claims 
about the relative desirability of different social 
outcomes. Appraising value judgments are 
usually considered to be normative economics, 
but it is obvious that characterizing value 
judgments are also normative and that they 
are essential to science. 
Hence, Blaug recognizes that the methodo-
logical judgments or ground rules employed by 
any theory, when it makes various characteriz-
ing value judgments, are not free of the 
normative commitments and appraising value 
judgments the theory's practitioners hold. For 
example, the neoclassical treatment of agents 
as rational maximizers can well be argued to 
depend on the view that it is desirable or 
morally praiseworthy that individuals pursue 
their own restricted well-being in market 
contexts, and that doing so produces the 
greatest social good through an "invisible 
hand" process. At the same time, this view of 
economic agents can easily be argued to rule 
out the idea that individuals ought morally to 
put justice in relations with others above 
individual gain, and that failure to do so 
furthers an alienated life dominated by im-
personal market relations. Thus, value judg-
ments of the appraising sort enter into 
economists' selection of concepts and methods 
at the most fundamental level, and we seem not 
to have improved our understanding of "posi-
tive" and " normative" economics using 
Nagel's distinction. 
Reconstituting means and ends 
A more promising approach, that also derives 
from a reconsideration of the nature of values, 
is to be found in institutionalist theory, which 
denies from the outset that positive and 
normative economics are mutually exclusive 
domains or categories. Dugger and Waller 
(1996), for example, accordingly argue that 
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the posItive deals with our evaluating means 
and the normative deals with evaluating ends. 
More importantly, however, what counts as a 
means and what counts as an end is relative to 
the situation at hand. Indeed, something can be 
a means on one occasion and an end on 
another. Thus, an evolutionary approach, 
which views the economy as being concerned 
with historical processes and PATH DEPEN-
DENCY, must be prepared to understand the 
continual reconstitution of means and ends. 
This explains the value permeation of 
economic reasoning at a fundamental level, 
and ushers in an alternative to normative 
positive dualism in the form of Thorstein 
Veblen's split between instrumental and cere-
monial knowledge. Instrumental knowledge is 
concerned with facts, getting things done and 
solving problems. Ceremonial knowledge is 
opposed to instrumental knowledge, and is 
concerned with prestige, getting credit for 
getting things done, and with exercising power 
(see INSTRUMENTAL VALUE THEORY). Since, 
throughout human history, the ceremonial has 
tended to prevail over the instrumental, a 
progressive economics aims at a critical appre-
hension of the use of power in the economy to 
gain position and prestige. Social problems -
not social theories - should be the focus of 
economics. Since society will never be free of 
problems, the aims and ends of society are 
always evolving, thus suggesting the idea of 
"evotopia" (moving toward an evolving good 
society) rather than utopia as a guiding view of 
good economics (Hodgson 1995). 
Ideology and analysis 
Finally, Dobb's Marxist appraisal of the posi-
tive and normative deserves attention. Dobb 
also begins with a re-characterization of values, 
and reconstructs the traditional Humean dual-
ism between "is" and "ought" in terms of a 
distinction between IDEOLOGY and analysis. In 
contrast to Hutchison's view of values and 
ideology as an individual's personal predilec-
tions and commitments, Dobb defines ideology 
as "a whole system of thought, or coordinated 
set of beliefs and ideas, which form a frame-
work, or higher-level group of related concepts, 
for more specific and particular notions, 
analyses, applications and conclusions" (1973: 
1). As such, individuals are often unconscious 
of their ideological views, and tend to take 
many of their elements as having been estab-
lished as " true" rather than "believed propo-
sitions. " For example, Dobb takes the 
traditional fact- value distinction itself as being 
ideological in that most economists take it to be 
rooted in incontrovertible truths rather than an 
unexamined belief. 
A view related to Dobb's needs to be 
distinguished. Schumpeter (1954) wrote of the 
difference between economic analysis and an 
economist's vision of the nature of reality and 
the problems at hand. The latter is ideological, 
and involves "a preanalytical cognitive act" 
which must precede "analytic effort in any 
field" and which may also "re-enter the history 
of every established science each time some-
body teaches us to see things in a light of which 
the source is not to be found in the facts 
methods, and results of the pre-existing state of 
the science" (Schumpeter 1954: 41). Yet, 
Schumpeter also claims that economic analysis 
can still be thought to be objective and 
independent of ideological views, indeed as a 
"box of tools" of a purely instrumental nature 
upon which scientific progress depends. Dobb 
rightly challenges this conception, arguing that 
this formal view of concepts as tools overlooks 
the way in which tools are developed for 
theoretical and ideological purposes. 
Thus, if we are to employ a distinction 
between positive and normative economics, it 
must be with great caution and an awareness of 
the ways in which values inevitably permeate 
theories. It is true that descriptive and prescrip-
tive language differ and that there are important 
differences between facts and values. However, 
economics is highly value-laden and, thus, 
understanding the role of values in economics 
is necessary to doing good economics. 
See also: 
ethics and morality ; modernism and 
postmodernism; natural rights; rhetoric 
North-South trade models 
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North-South trade models 
Models of North- South trade examine the 
interaction of two regions: the rich North (also 
called the metropolis, core or center) compris-
ing "developed" economies, and the poor 
South (also called the periphery) comprising 
"less-developed" economies. Special reference 
is placed on international trade, factor move-
ments, technology transfer and related factors. 
They consider the links between the two 
regions, and usually highlight the dynamic 
interaction between, and the structural differ-
ences between, the two regions. They can be 
seen as a reaction to the dominant micro-
theoretic Heckscher- Ohlin- Samuelson (HOS) 
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